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DANIEL R. LARSEN and Appeal No. 970454-CA 
CATHERINE J. WHEELER, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
ARgPMENT 
Mr. Gamble seeks: 1) post-adoption visitation with his two 
sons consistent with the agreement of the parties and because it 
would be in the best interests of the children; 2) failing that, 
to set aside the Decree of Adoption due to fraud and its 
procurement and fraud upon the court; and, 3) to have the matter 
certified to the Juvenile Court. 
The response of the Defendants may be summarized as follows: 
1) the claim for post-adoption visitation or "open-adoption" was 
not raised below; 2) there was no consideration or agreement 
beyond that specified in the adoption consent; 3) furthermore, 
visitation with the children can only derive from Mr. Gamble's 
parental rights; 4) even if there was an agreement for post-
adoption visitation, the term of that agreement fails for being 
too vague; 5) there are no allegations in the proposed Amended 
Complaint to support a finding of fraud or coercion; 6) rather 
than certifying the matter to Juvenile Court, due to the pendency 
of the termination proceeding, the District Court case should 
have voluntarily dismissed and refiled in the Juvenile Court. 
POINT I. 
THE ISSUE OF POST-ADOPTION VISITATION OR 
"oPEy-apQPTiQy" WAS RAISED BE^OW. 
The Defendants acknowledge in their brief that the "concept 
of 'open adoption1 may have merit in evaluating the best 
interests of a child in the context of an on-going adoption 
proceeding . . . " (Defendants1 Responsive Brief, page 9.) 
However, the Defendants claim no less than seven times in their 
brief that this claim was never raised below. (Defendants1 
Responsive Brief, pages i, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, and 26.) 
In fact, Mr. Gamble's Complaint pleads in the alternative, 
in the second and third causes of action as follows: 
"38. In the event that the Court does not 
rescind the adoption, it would be in the best 
interests of the children that the Court 
restore to the Plaintiff and provide formally 
and by way of order for the Plaintiff's 
visitation rights with Trevor and Baron. 
39. The Plaintiff's visitation rights should 
correspond to the rights provided for in the 
Decree of Divorce referred to above, except 
as may have been modified by the parties' 
practice, if at all, since the granting of 
the Decree of Divorce . . . 
41. The parties agreed for on-going 
visitation in consideration of the adoption. 
The Defendants have breached the agreement by 
unilaterally terminating the contractual 
visitation rights of the Plaintiff. 
42. The only adequate remedy available at 
law is that of specific performance. 
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43. Defendants should be ordered, per the 
contract of the parties', to facilitate and 
permit on-going contact and visitation." 
(Plaintiff's Proposed Amended Verified 
Complaint.)x 
Additionally, the subject of post-adoption visitation and 
specifically "open-adoption" was extensively argued and briefed 
below. Mr. Gamble's "Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and in Support 
of the Plaintiff's Motion" cites many of the cases relied upon by 
Mr. Gamble in his appeal, and specifically refers to open-
adoption as a concept, and as the relief which he sought before 
the trial court in Point III, pages 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 of 
that brief which is attached hereto as part of the Addendum to 
this brief and marked Exhibit "J". 
Even if Mr. Gamble had not specifically used the words 
"open-adoption" below, which he did, the relief he sought in his 
Complaint and before the trial court is the same. Mr. Gamble 
seeks post-adoption visitation and contact with the subject 
children. By definition, any arrangement that permits 
communication or contact between the natural parent and the 
adopted child, after the adoption, or between the natural and 
xThe Amended Complaint contains the third cause of action 
seeking specific performance. The trial court refused to grant 
the amendment stating: "Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the 
Complaint should be denied as futile since the Amended Complaint 
likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 
for the reasons stated above." (Paragraph 9, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order.) For purposes of this appeal, Mr. 
Gamble has treated that ruling as one granting a Motion to 
Dismiss as to the third cause of action seeking specific 
performance of the contract. 
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adoptive parents, constitutes "an open-adoption". In the matter 
of the adoption Qf Jeremiah Halloway, Navajo Nation, 732 P.2d, 
962 (Utah 1986). 
Lastly, Judge Brian in both the Minute Entry and his 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law specifically refers to Mr. 
Gamble's claim for post-adoption visitation. (Trial court's 
"Minute Entry" attached hereto and marked Addendum Exhibit "K", 
and Findings of Fact 8-10, and Conclusions of Law 4, 5, 7, and 9, 
Trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
Addendum Exhibit "A" attached to Plaintiff's principal Brief.) 
Mr. Gamble first and foremost seeks on-going post-adoption 
visitation with the children. The matter was expressly framed, 
raised and ruled upon by the trial judge and is properly before 
this court. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT NOT 0N&Y FOUND AE AGREEMENT 
FOR THE ADOPTION, BUT THAT THE TERMS OF THAT 
AGREEMENT WENT BEYOND THOSE SPECIFIED IN THE 
CONSENT FOR ADOPTION, 
The trial court's Minute Entry states as follows: 
"The Court finds that there was an agreement 
re: release by natural mother of all claims 
for child support arrearages and on-going 
child support in exchange for natural 
father's signing of the consent to adoption." 
(Trial court's Minute Entry)(emphasis added) 
It is undisputed that the parties stipulated and agreed that 
in consideration of Mr. Gamble's executing a consent in 
connection with the adoption of Trevor and Baron, Defendant 
Catherine Wheeler, the natural mother, would waive child support 
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arrearages. The letter from the Defendants1 lawyer which 
identifies the consideration for Mr. Gamble's consent states as 
follows: 
"When the adoption has become final, I will 
file a satisfaction of judgment regarding the 
Order on Order to Show Cause previously 
entered against you. In addition, if any 
negative credit history appears because of 
this judgment, we will arrange for that to be 
removed from your credit report. It is my 
understanding that Trevor and Baron will 
retain the surname Wheeler-Gamble during the 
period of their minority. Also, you may 
maintain the present visitation schedule with 
Trevor and Baron. Finally, once your 
parental rights are terminated, you are under 
no continuing obligation to provide any 
support for Trevor and Baron." (Kevin Fife 
letter, dated March 8, 1995, Addendum Exhibit 
"B" attached to Plaintiff's principal Brief.) 
However, the "Certified Consent of Father . . . " ("the 
consent") makes no reference whatsoever to child support 
arrearages, the question of the children's surname, the issue of 
a negative credit rating, or, most importantly, the agreement for 
on-going post-adoption visitation. Nevertheless, the trial court 
looked beyond the consent and specifically found that the waiver 
of child support arrearages was part of the consideration for the 
consent even though it is mentioned nowhere in the consent. 
It is clear that the court below determined that an 
agreement existed. The consideration for the agreement was Mr. 
Gamble's consent. In exchange he was to receive at least the 
waiver of any claim for child support arrearages which was not 
mentioned in the consent itself. Contrary to the Defendants' 
representation, the parties did have an agreement. However, the 
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court went on to find that the agreement for post-adoption 
visitation was simply too vague. 
Even if this Court finds that there was no agreement for 
post-adoption visitation, the Court can still find that 
visitation should be permitted if it is in the best interests of 
the children. The Defendants acknowledge that the best interests 
of the children may be the basis for an open-adoption. (Brief of 
Appellees, page 9.) However, the Defendants claim that once a 
consent is signed and a Decree of Adoption entered there is no 
standing to assert post-adoption visitation. The Defendants do 
not address other situations where non-parent visitation is 
allowed including step-parent visitation, same-sex partner 
visitation, and grandparent visitation as well as the cases 
allowing post-adoption visitation which are referred to in pages 
17 - 22 of the Brief of the Appellant. 
Visitation rights may flow from either parental rights or 
the best interests of the children. 
POINT III. 
THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT FOR POST-ADOPTION 
VISITATION IS SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR AND WAS 
DEFINED BY THEIR PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT. 
For more than 22 months following the adoption, Mr. Gamble 
continued to visit the children just as he had prior to the 
adoption. His visitation prior to the adoption was based upon 
the visitation permitted under the Decree of Divorce and 
constituted "reasonable visitation". The visitation that Mr. 
Gamble expected would continue pursuant to his agreement with the 
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Defendants would permit the maintenance of "the present 
visitation schedule with Trevor and Baron". (Letter of Kevin J. 
Fife, dated March 8, 1995, Addendum Exhibit "B" attached to the 
principal Brief of the Appellant.) 
The parties understood what the present visitation schedule 
was. That schedule continued for 22 months after the adoption. 
Even if the term of the contract for visitation is considered 
vague, the court may supply the missing term or other 
deficiencies based upon parole evidence. Messick v. PHD Trucking 
SERV., Inc., 678 P.2d, 791 (Utah 1984). Any terms applied by the 
court must meet the "reasonableness test". Allstate Entersr Inc. 
v. Heriford, 772 P.2d, 466, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) and Olympus 
Bill? Shopping Ctr, Ltflt vf Smith'g FQQfl, 889 p.2d, 445 (Utah ct. 
App. 1994). 
The term of the contract which would permit post-adoption 
visitation is found in the same document and in the same 
paragraph that the trial court relied upon in finding that the 
parties agreed for the waiver of child support arrearages. The 
trial court failed to enforce that provision of the agreement, 
finding that the visitation language was "insufficient" and, "the 
attorney's letter does not define the visitation schedule, 
explain how the visitation schedule could be modified, provide an 
enforcement mechanism, or preclude the Defendants from 
terminating the visitation schedule." (Paragraph 4, trial court's 
Conclusions of Law.) 
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The same deficiencies could be found in virtually any 
divorce stipulation or decree where the parties agree and the 
court orders "reasonable visitation" for the non-custodial 
parent. Few divorce stipulations or decrees explain how the 
visitation schedule could be modified or provide a specific 
mechanism for enforcement or expressly state that the custodial 
parent is precluded from terminating the visitation schedule. 
While many stipulations and decrees define the visitation 
schedule precisely, many do not. In this case, the agreement 
provided for the continuation of the "present visitation schedule 
with Trevor and Baron". The present schedule of visitation was 
defined by the parties' practice and the Decree of Divorce. The 
Decree of Divorce provided for specific visitation for Mr. Gamble 
in paragraph 2a.- 2g. (Wheeler v. Gamble "Decree of Divorce", 
Civil No. 884903729DA attached as Addendum Exhibit "L" and 
previously attached as Exhibit "A" to the Plaintiff's Proposed 
Amended Verified Complaint.) 
Mr. Gamble's visitation under the Decree of Divorce and in 
practice satisfies all of the deficiencies cited by the trial 
judge. Even if this were not the case, parole evidence could be 
taken which would allow the court to determine the "present 
visitation schedule" for purposes of enforcement. The "present 
visitation schedule" in practice and pursuant to the Decree, did 
not permit Mrs. Wheeler to unilaterally terminate visitation 
between Mr. Gamble and the children. 
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POINT IV. 
MR, GAMBLE'S COMPLAINT RAISES THE ISSUE OF 
FRAUD WHICH IS SUFFICIENT TO SET ASIDE THE 
DECREE OF ADOPTION, 
In addition to the fact that the Defendants fraudulently 
represented to Mr. Gamble that he could maintain the present 
visitation schedule, the Defendants also failed to inform the 
court of that agreement. Mr. Gamble had every right to assume 
that all of the critical elements of the parties1 agreement 
surrounding the adoption would be divulged to the court. Those 
terms include not only the on-going visitation, but also the 
waiver of child support arrearages. None of these terms were 
referenced in the adoption consent. The trial court found that 
some of these terms were part of the parties1 agreement, 
nevertheless. The Defendants have not appealed that ruling. 
Additionally, Mr. Gamble's Complaint alleges that he was 
threatened by the Defendants with criminal prosecution if he did 
not sign the consent (paragraph 15, Plaintiff's Proposed Amended 
Complaint). This threat was particularly real in light of 
Defendant Larsen's position with the Utah Attorney General's 
office. While the Defendants dispute this allegation, at page 25 
of the responsive brief, it should be assumed as true for 
purposes of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
POINT V. 
THE ENTIRE MATTER SHOULD HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED 
TO THE JUVENILE COURT, 
As demonstrated above, the trial court considered and ruled 
upon Mr. Gamble's claim for post-adoption visitation. The 
10 
suggestion by the Defendants at page 2 6 of their responsive brief 
to the contrary is incorrect. Additionally, it is important to 
remember that the Plaintiff refiled the termination cause of 
action in the Juvenile Court only as a response to the 
Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss. The Plaintiff was more than 
willing to have this matter determined by the District Court. 
The Defendants moved to dismiss the matter and specifically the 
termination of parental rights cause of action. Admittedly, the 
Defendants1 motion in that regard was well taken. 
The suggestion that the Plaintiff was "forum shopping" or 
"judge shopping" is unfounded. As set forth above, the 
Plaintiff's Juvenile Court proceeding was commenced in response 
to the Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss. Likewise, the Juvenile 
Court proceeding and the Motion to Certify the case were both 
filed prior to learning of Judge Brian's ruling. Therefore, the 
suggestion of the Defendants', at page 28 of their brief, that 
the Motion to Certify the case to Juvenile Court was undertaken 
simply because the Plaintiff did not like the outcome of the law 
suit is illogical. 
The Defendants suggest that the District Court case should 
simply have been dismissed and refiled. The effect of the Motion 
to Certify the matter to Juvenile Court is the same. 
The Juvenile Court action is pending. Juvenile Court Judge 
Valdez has overruled the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss that 
action. See Addendum Exhibit "M". 
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FOR PURPOSES OF THIS APPEAL. THE ALLEGATIONS 
OF THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TRUE. 
The Defendants1 memorandum frequently takes issue with the 
facts as r"o+- f^ r+"'r' •* ]aintiff!s Complain1" A -.onq nth^r 
fact;.
 ; *.: - - -r . 
the parties agreed for post-adoption visitation; * * * ;ne 
post-adopti ~r trisi tr?r t ^  continued as ^ ^ •« - before for 
approximate^ * 
Defendant • 'tie consent to adoption aia not reflect 
the entir**"" * v*~ carties1 agreement. 
lowe v;our t :: the course • the Motion to ismiss. 
standard eview as well i^  'hi- facts -h^ r-^ ,!r+-
rely up^ i- .. .. .King iio aecisio;* 21a ,^  .ut:. „j. i _ . _ j t •_ .. 
by - _ih Appellate Courts. 
"When reviewing a trial court's grant of a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "we accept 
the factual allegations in the complaint as 
true and consider them and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from them, in a light 
most favorable to the plaintiff'. Because the 
propriety of a 12(b)(6) dismissal is a 
question of law, we give the trial court's 
ruling no deference and we review it under a 
correctness standard" Alvarez v. Galetkaf 
933 p.2d 987 (Utah 1997)(citations omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
At the time ti,,. t^dintiff consented ..^  -u.-t-.-
sons the parties entered into an agreement, .e consideration 
.ireement that, 
among o t h e r t i l i n g s , Lite r i a inL j . iL wwiutw c o n t i n u e t h e p r e s e n t 
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visitation with the children. That term, and other terms, are 
not reflected in the consent. The parties went on to partially 
perform that agreement until the Defendants unilaterally 
terminated any contact including visitation 22 months after the 
adoption. The parties1 agreement should be approved and 
enforced. Continued contact, including visitation, is in the 
best interests of the children. If it is determined that such an 
agreement is contrary to public policy or unenforceable, then the 
adoption should be set aside. If the matter is remanded it 
should be referred to the Juvenile Court on remand at which time 
the Court may determine what on-going visitation would be in the 
best interests of the children. 
DATED THIS /fo day of January, 1998. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
GREEN & BERRY 
TREDERICK N. GREEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Frederick N. Green, certify that on the day of 
January, 1998, I served a copy of the attached Brief of Appellant 
upon A. Howard Lundgren and Sheleigh A. Chalkley, counsel for 
Defendant/Appellee in this matter by mailing a copy by first 
class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following 
address: 257 East 200 South, #340, Mailbox 10, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. 
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W- i W. Downes, J r. (#090 7) 
Wl ,i & HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 2 00 South, Suite 4 000 
Post Office Box 2 668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Daniel R. Larsen 
and Catherine J. Wheeler 
•"JUL * \-/l\ 
DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
. ri i JL L' r 
interest of 
-HEELER GAMBLE and 
WHEELER GAMBLE, 
Persons under the age 
~^ eighteen ^ years. 
IjhJl 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case Nos. 933163, 933164 
Judge Andrew A. Valdez 
••^ fieler and Daniel Larsen hereby submit their 
memorandum ct p^.^ts „m 
dismiss petitioner's amended petition for termination of 
t h e i r p. i r P n f a 1 r i. q h t s. 
FACTS 
] aron Wheeler Gamble is the 12 year old son of 
resDondents, Catherine Wheeler and Daniel Larsen. 
Trevor Wheeler ijduible i1 'Is f 
respondents, Catherine Wheeler and Daniei Larsen. 
3. i March ? n. inQC:- Gentry Gamble relinquished his 
parental rights i. - r^r _._ :•:. - Lei: Gamble <= J: i I T:i : e • :)i : Wheel er 
Gamble. A true and correct copy of Mr. Gamble's consent is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
4. A decree of adoption was entered by the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick on April 27, 1995 forever terminating the 
parental rights of Gentry Gamble to Baron and Trevor Wheeler 
Gamble and declaring Daniel R. Larsen to have adopted the minor 
children. A true and correct copy of Judge Frederick's order 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
5. Gentry Gamble reported his allegations of abuse to 
the State of Utah, Division of Child and Family Services. The 
Division of Child and Family Services carefully investigated 
the petitioner's claims of abuse. No referrals of the matter 
were made to Juvenile Court following an investigation by the 
Division of Child and Family Services. 
6. Gentry Gamble seeks in his petition to terminate the 
relationship between Catherine Wheeler and Daniel Larsen and 
their two children, Trevor and Baron. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
GENTRY GAMBLE LACKS STANDING TO 
PETITION THIS COURT FOR TERMINATION 
OF RESPONDENTS' PARENTAL RIGHTS. 
In March of 1995, petitioner, Gentry Gamble, decided to 
freely and voluntarily relinquish his rights to his children. 
He understood following the adoption that he would be released 
from all future parental duties toward and all future respon-
2 
SibxIiLias tui i I n - i;hil<Jifc " Iri^ l uml I M I 
further rights with regard to tne children- However,, he seeks 
:li i i I: :i :ii =; petit to terminate the relationship *^ Catheri ne 
"W 1: iee] er ai id Dai :i:i • =; 1! I ar s = it 1 t :: t:J: i = :ii i: 1 0 ar 
t Chapter 3A, Title 78 provides that any 
interested party niay file a petition for termination of the 
11 i s 1: :i i p ; : e 
Section 78-3A-4(] ) (a) . The ter ra "interested party" is not 
lefined terr Chapter 3A. Absent a definition -ne term 
• -. • -;tc • • - * 
with the traditional test for standing ^rdtr -^ commence a 
•'-I*' actioi party must be able io show that ne or she has 
a 
sonal stake ±n the outcome ^; the i ^ j A proceeding. Jenkins 
v. Swan, - (Utah 1983); Stromquist v. Cokayne, 646 
petitioner have a 
•-rsonal stake . ,i Lie outcome of ^ dispute is roote, 
the historical and constitutional role of the judiciary in 
•\f\: * ir- courts to a 
role consistent *„th c^e separatiw,. .; ^^^ers a;.d the 
jurisdiction of the courts to those disputes which are most 
eff /"f-~ctively resolved through the judicial 
process. Jenkins, supra. 
Gentry Gamble has no legal interes: :n Trevor or Baron 
W'f=- ' He voluntari1** gave » ip nis rights to these 
3 
children in 1995. Petitioner's interest in these minor chil-
dren is no different from that of any other citizen in the 
state of Utah. As an unrelated person to these minor children, 
the petitioner lacks standing to prosecute the respondents in 
order to cause a termination of parental rights. Such actions 
should be brought by the Attorney General on behalf of the 
state of Utah. 
The Division of Child and Family Services of the State of 
Utah is empowered to promote and enforce state and federal laws 
enacted for the protection of abused, neglected and dependent 
children. It is directed to provide substitute care for such 
children. Utah Code Ann. Section 62A-4A-101, et. sea. The 
Division of Child and Family Services has investigated 
petitioner's complaints in this matter and has chosen to take 
no legal action. Petitioner is seeking to substitute his 
judgment for that of the Division of Child and Family Services 
and personally prosecute this action. Petitioner lacks the 
legal standing to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents respectfully submit that petitioner lacks 
standing to seek to terminate respondents' parental rights, and 
this action should be dismissed. 
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<2^-t DATED this 
WINDER 
By L£ 
William W. Downes, Jr. 
Attorney for Daniel R. Larsen 
and Catherine J. Wheeler 
C E R T I F I C A T E ^ riAJ.^,.G 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
*~
He foregoing Memorandum r"f r-n jnts and Author it IPS ' P Support 
paid, the v^)!^* day of Jui/, . .-- •. . i.ne following: 
Frederick N. 
GREEN & BERRY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 62 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Hy^fr *- -v ^tc^^ 11 
Kevin J. Fife (Bar No. 5962) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Facsimile (801) 355-1813 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE ADOPTION OF: 
TREVOR B. WHEELER GAMBLE and 
BARON G. WHEELER GAMBLE, 
minor children. 
CERTIFIED CONSENT OF FATHER 
GrVTNG UP RIGHTS TO 
CHILDREN CONCEIVED OR BORN 
WITHIN MARRIAGE AND WAIVER 
OF NOTICE 
Probate No. 952900102AD 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
DO NOT SIGN THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT READING IT. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS 
WHATSOEVER, MAKE SURE YOU CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY BEFORE SIGNING 
THIS DOCUMENT. BY SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT, YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHTS 
AS A PARENT. YOU CANNOT REVOKE THE CONSENT TO YOUR CfflLDREN'S 
ADOPTION ONCE YOU SIGN THIS DOCUMENT. 
) 
:ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Gentry Gamble, being first duly sworn upon oath, or affirmation, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. He was born on September 19, 1957 at Bediesda, Maryland. 
v» 
EXHIBIT Ah 
2. He is the biological father of the minor children sought to be adopted, to wit: 
Trevor B. Wheeler Gamble, who was born on the February 10, 1987, Baron G. Wheeler 
Gamble, who was born on July 24, 1985. 
3. He understands that a verified petition for adoption of the minor children has been 
filed and that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.7 (1990, as amended). He must respond 
to the petition within thirty (30) days of service if he intends to contest the adoption, and hereby 
waives all notices pursuant to that section. 
4. He is not under the influence of alcohol, drugs, medication, or any impairment 
of ability to understand and appreciate the significance of giving his consent to adoption. 
5. He signs this consent freely and voluntarily and not under any duress, coercion, 
or force. 
6. He understands that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.3 (1990, as amended), 
his consent to adoption is effective when signed and may not be revoked. 
7. He understands that from the time the final decree of adoption is entered, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-11 (1990, as amended), he will be released from all future parental 
duties toward and all future responsibilities for the adopted children, and have no further rights 
with -regard to the children. 
8. He understands that from the time the final decree of adoption is entered, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-9 (1990, as amended), that the children will be adopted by the 
petitioner and the children shall be regarded and treated in all respects as the children of the 
petitioner and Catherine Wheeler. 
wheel\consenc\mm 2. 
9. He understands that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-10 (1990, as amended), 
from the time the final decree of adoption is entered, the petitioner and the children shall sustain 
the legal relationship of parent and child and have all the rights and be subject to all the duties 
of that relationship. 
10. He has had the opportunity to consult with and obtain the advice of an attorney 
of his choice. 
11. He understands that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.2 (1990, as amended), 
that he is entitled to a copy of this consent. 
12. He consents to the granting of a petition for adoption and consents to the adoption 
by petitioner of the children. 
13. He waives notice of pendency of these adoption proceedings pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-30-4.7(4) (1990, as amended). 
14. He has read and understands the foregoing consent to adoption, and signs it freely 
and voluntarily. 
15. He states upon his oath or affirmation that all statements contained in this consent 
are true and correct to the best of the knowledge of the undersigned. 
DATED this ffff^ay of I.UfOCh . 1995. 
wheci\consent\mm J 
CERTIFICATION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3CW.2 (1990, as amended), I certify that on the ^ 0 ^ 
day of 'nV^Q.K _ , 1995, personally appeared before me, Gentry Gamble, personally 
known to me or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person whose name 
is signed above, and I certify to the best of my information and belief that said person has read 
and understood the foregoing consent and has signed it freely and voluntarily. 
Where the above consent is signed by a birth mother, or the child sought to be adopted, 
or other person, I certify that I am a judge of a court that has jurisdiction over adoption 
proceedings, or a public officer appointed by that judge for the purpose of taking consents. 
DATED this 2 ^ ' d a y of iVuvAC1'1 , 1995. 
JUDGE OR JUDICIALLY APPOINTED OFFICER 
In the case of persons signing the above consent other than a birth mother or an adoptee, 
I sign as a notary public as follows: 
" NOIARY PUBLIC I NOTARYLPbBLIC : 
Residing at:^AV U R I'OUlfy , l ^ ' u Mindy Mildenhalt 
S2S East 100 South 
Salt laid city. Utah 64102 
My Commission Expires 
July 22. 1983 
STATE OF IITAH 
whed\conseru\mm 4 
Kevin J. Fife (Bar No. 5962) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Facsimile (801) 355-1813 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
APH 2 7 1995 
Lttht COu^TY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE ADOPTION OF 
TREVOR B. WHEELER GAMBLE and 
BARON G. WHEELER GAMBLE, 
minor children. 
DECREE OF ADOPTION 
Probate No. 952900102AD 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for hearing on Thursday, the 27th day 
of April, 1995 at 9:00 a.m., the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding, for consideration of 
the petition of Daniel R. Larsen to adopt Trevor B. Wheeler Gamble ("Trevor") and Baron G. 
Wheeler Gamble ("Baron"). Mr. Larsen was present in person and represented by counsel, 
Kevin J. Fife. Also present were Trevor and Baron and their natural mother, Catherine 
Wheeler. The court heard and considered the testimony of Petitioner, Trevor, Baron and 
Catherine Wheeler, considered the contents of the file and having heretofore made and entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
i \ 
EXHiBiT ' 5 ' 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties to this action. 
2. Because Trevor and Baron were brought into Utah by Catherine Wheeler and 
Gentry Gamble, their natural parents, the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children, Utah 
Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701 (1953, as amended), is not applicable to this adoption. 
3. Daniel R. Larsen is declared to have adopted Trevor and Baron and from this date 
forward shall owe to them all the rights and responsibilities of a natural father to natural children 
and Trevor and Baron shall owe to Daniel Larsen the responsibilities of a child to their natural 
father. 
4. All rights and interests of Gentry Gamble with regard to Trevor and Baron are 
hereby and forever terminated. 
5. Trevor and Baron shall continue to be known as Trevor B. Wheeler Gamble and 
Baron G. Wheeler Gamble. 
6. The Clerk of this Court shall make four (4) certified copies of this Decree of 
Adoption which shall be delivered to Petitioner's counsel, and then shall seal this file and not 
permit examination of the file by any person or party without further order of the court. 







IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GAMBLE, GENTRY 
VS 




CASE NUMBER 970901796 CV 
DATE 05/09/97 
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN 
COURT REPORTER (NOT REPORTED) 
COURT CLERK BHY 
TYPE OF HEARING: MOTION TO DISMISS 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. GREEN, FREDERICK N 
D. ATTY. DOWNES, WILLIAM W 
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT FOR HEARING RE: DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS. BOTH PARTIES ARE PRESENT WITH COUNSEL, AS 
SHOWN ABOVE. THE COURT HEARS ARGUMENT FROM BOTH COUNSEL. 
THE COURT FINDS THAT THE NATURAL FATHER SIGNED A CONSENT TO 
ADOPTION ON 3/20/95. THE CONSENT CLEARLY STATED ON ITS FACE 
THAT ALL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NATURAL FATHER WERE 
PERMANANTLY TERMINATED. THE DECREE OF ADOPTION ALSO CLEARLY 
STATES THIS. 
THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT RE: RELEASE BY 
NATURAL MOTHER OF ALL CLAIMS FOR CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES AND 
ONGOING CHILD SUPPORT, IN EXCHANGE FOR NATURAL FATHER'S SIGNING 
OF THE CONSENT TO ADOPTION. 
THE COURT FINDS THERE IS ONE LETTER IN EVIDENCE BEFORE THE 
COURT TODAY THAT CONTAINS A BRIEF REFERENCE TO VISITATION FOR 
THE NATURAL FATHER. THE COURT FINDS THAT THIS IS TOO VAGUE FOR 
THE COURT TO ENFORCE. 
THE COURT FINDS THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO 
STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. THE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS (RELATING TO ALL THREE CAUSES OF ACTION) IS 
GRANTED. THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IS DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT IS DENIED. 
* i i> J < s 
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS IS TO PREPARE THE FINDINGS AND ORDER 
FROM TODAY'S HEARING AND DELIEVER A COPY TO OPPOSING COUNSEL FOR 




.iARY C. CORPORON #734 ^ _ — — — m ~
 W Rn 
Attorney for Plaintiff ftrK i 4 ^m 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS ,. ,^'<* 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building \XX(\^\Xi 
#9 Exchange Place
 0r ^ O ^ ^ -
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
CATHERINE WHEELER, "^  * l O O ^ ^ __ 
Plaintiff, DECREE OF DIVORCE 
-vs- Civil No. 884903729DA 
GENTRY GAMBLE, Judge Hoirer F. Wilkinson 
Defendant. 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on for hearing before 
the above-entitled court on Friday, the 14th day of April, 1989, 
at the hour of 9:30 a.m., the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge 
presiding; the plaintiff appearing in person and by and through 
counsel, Mary C. Corporon, and the defendant not appearing, 
either in person or through counsel, but the parties having 
stipulated to a full settlement of all issues raised and 
outstanding in this action and the Court havxng approved the 
same, the defendant having consented, among other things, that 
his default may be entered to the plaintiff's Complaint, pursuant 
to the terms and conditions of urn* parties' Stipulation, the 
default of the defendant was duly entered; the pla^ LntjL'f«f^ ,(i^ \ng 
been duly sworn and having testified in her own pehafu 
Court having reviewed the file herein; based thereon, "asid'/xippn 
motion of plaintiff's counsel, the Court being fully advised in 
the premises and more than 90 days having elapsed since the 
filing of the Complaint in this action, and the Court having 
heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, now, therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce, 
dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the 
parties. the same to become final and effective immediately upon 
being signed by the Judge and entered by the clerk in the 
register of actions. 
2. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the permanent care, custody 
and control of the parties' minor children, Barron and Trevor, 
subject to defendant's reasonable rights of visitation, to be 
defined as follows: 
a. Plaintiff shall have the children with her the two 
weekends per month when she is off work and should advise the 
defendant at the beginning of the month which weekends she has 
off; the defendant should have visitation on the remaining two or 
three weekends in that month when the plaintiff is working, from 
Saturday at 6:00 p.m. until Monday at 6:00 p.m.; 
b. For a period of two hours every Tuesday and 
Thursday afternoon; 
c. Alternate state and federal holidays; 
d. Father's Day, andf likewise, the plaintiff shall 
have the children on Mother's Day, irrespective of app-^dthej: 
L c« y ^ 
portion of this visitation schedule; £ /
 y<_,\_ <y <, 
e. Two weeks during the summer, commenci 
2 \yss&*?j> 
summer of 1989, and increasing to one month commencing with the 
summer of 1992 and thereafter. Said summer visitation should be 
agreed upon between the parties in advance. Further, plaintiff 
shall have a reciprocal right to vacation time with the minor 
children for an uninterrupted period of time without being deemed 
to have interfered with defendant's rights of visitation; 
f. An additional period of time during the week of 
each of the minor children's birthdays, in which to celebrate the 
respective child's birthday; 
g. Both parties shall have open telephone contact with 
the minor children. 
3. Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum 
of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month, per child, as and for 
child support, for the support and maintenance of the minor 
children of the parties, for a total support obligation of Four 
Hundred Dollars ($400.00) per month, until each child has 
attained the age of 18 years or graduated from high school in due 
course, whichever last occurs. Said child support award shall be 
reviewable six months after the entry of this Decree of Divorce 
to determine if there has been any change in the defendant's 
income. 
4. If the defendant falls thirty (30) or more days in 
arrears in his child support obligation, the plaintiff shall be 
entitled to mandatory income withholding relief, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 62A-11-401, et. seq. (Supp. 1988). 
5. Neither party is awarded any alimony from the other 
party, and both parties are deemed to have waived a ni^ 3^S^^£ o r 
alimony from the other. 
6« Both plaintiff and defendant are hereby ordered to 
maintain in force health and accident and dental insurance for 
the benefit of the minor children of the parties, when it is 
available through his or her employmentf until each child attains 
the age of 18 years or graduates from high school in due course, 
whichever last occurs. Further, each party is ordered to pay and 
assume one-half of all medical, dental, orthodontic, optical and 
psychotherapeutic expenses incurred for the benefit of the minor 
children which are not covered by insurance; however, plaintiff 
should be reguired to prove that she has paid her one-half share 
rather than having her half paid through complimentary care. 
7. Plaintiff and defendant are each hereby ordered to 
maintain in force a policy of insurance on his or her own life, 
having a benefit payable on death in the minimum sum of Fifty 
Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00), naming the minor chLldren of the 
parties as the primary beneficiaries of such insurance, until 
each child has attained the age of 18 years or graduated from 
high school in due course, whichever last: occurs. 
8- Each party is hereby awarded all property currently in 
his or her own possession, as his or her sole and separate 
property, 
9- Each party is hereby awarded all savings, checking and 
other banking accounts and IRAs held in his or her own name, free 
and clear of any interest of the other party. 
10. Defendant is hereby awarded all right, title and 
interest in his bank accounts and holdings in the State of 
Louisiana which he has through inheritance and $€&&*• ^ ^y&v h i s 
family, free and clear of any interest of the pla|ny.f^^^i \ \ 
11. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay and assume her 
school loans and defendant is hereby ordered to pay and assume 
all debts incurred in connection with his business, and each 
party is ordered to hold the other harmless thereon. Further, 
each party is ordered co pay and assume any and all debts and 
obligations incurred in his or her ovm name since the date of 
separation of the parties. 
12. Each party is hereby ordered to execute and deliver all 
necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the 
property of the parties pursuant to this Decree. 
DATED THIS /( day of April, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of 
Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff herein, and that 
I caused the foregoing proposed Decree of Divorce to be served 
upon defendant by placing a true and correct copy of the same in 
an envelope addressed to: 
TAMARA J. HAUGE 
Attorney for Defendant 
136 East South Temple 
Suite 2100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-
paid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah 





IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT NOV I 3 1997 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
— _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . —— JuvonHe Court 
™ Tin? INTEREST OK-
GAMBLE, Trevor B. Wheeler (02/10/87) 
GAMBLE, Baron B Wheeler (07/24/85) 
rLNDLNGS AND 
ORDER 
case .NO. y j J i b i & 933164 
1 ci sons under the age of eighteen (18) years. 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on respondents, Daniel Larsen and 
Catherine J. Wheeler's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Petition for the Termination of Parental 
Rights filed by petitioner Gentry Gamble. Respondents submit that petitioner, the biological 
father, lacks standing to petition this court for termination of the respondents rights. Respondents 
assert that because petitioner, Mr. Gamble, previously consented to the adoption of the above 
named children by respondent, Daniel Larsen, spouse of the biological mother, petitioner 
relinquished his parental rights to his children and can not now claim "interested party" status 
under Utah. Code Ann 78-3 a 404,,. 
The respondents and petitioner proceeded to present memorandum evidence, and 
argument upon which the Court bases its Findings and Conclusions: 
FIN DINGS OF f AC' I CONCLU SIONS Of LAW 
1. I he applicable statute is U.C.A. 78-3 a-404 (1997). Respondent cited to \ C A 78-3a-
4(1 )(a), a statute which does not exist. 
2. In recent years the Utah Legislature has amended the statute in question and each time they 
seem to have expanded the number of people who may file petitions to terminate parental rights. 
In 1993 the legislature added "or district attorney" to subsection 2. This allowed for more 
individuals to file the petition for termination under subsection 2 of this statute.1 
3. In 1994 the Legislature again rewrote the statute, allowing more people to file this petition. 
Before this amendment, the statute cited to the specific individuals who could file this petition: 
"The Division, the child's guardian ad litem, blood relative, or adoptive relative of the child " 
Utah Code Ann. 78-3f-104(1) (a) (1993). This was a very specific list of individuals who could 
file this petition. The change replaced this very specific list to a more general term (their term in 
question here): "Any interested party..." Utah Code Ann. 78-3a-404(l) (a). It seems clear that 
with this change the Utah Legislature removed a very rigid and explicit list and replaced it with a 
general term. The interpretation one can extrapolate from this, is that they intended to grant 
-«div;^'"iK'iU^ .w^^r-r, MUX |o file this petition This makes sense if the purpose is to protect 
Statute used to be cited as 78-3f-104 until 1994 when the legislature renumbered it to its 
current number 78-3a-404. 
the welfare of a child. 
4. The Legislature also changed subsection 2, which used to read: 
'The Division may request either the Attorney General or an appropriate 
county attorney or district attorney to file a petition for termination of 
parental rights under this part." Id at (2) (1993) 
The change deleted appropriate county attorney and district attorney and left only the Attorney 
General. Although this second change does reduce the individuals allowed to file the petition on 
behalf of the division, the term interested party can be interpreted to include all individuals not 
cited. 
5. The most recent changes2 has been of deleting the condition of having at least one year of 
custody of the child before a foster parent could file for this petition. This change came in the 
latest legislative session, 1997. By removing this language they have allowed for foster parents to 
file this petition with less than a year of custody. This opens the door for more petitions of this 
kind by more people, in this case more foster parents. Again, it seems that the amendments done 
by the legislature have opened the doors for more people to prosecute these petitions. 
CONCLUSION 
The revisions by the Legislature indicate the term "any person" is intended to be defined in 
its broadest meaning. Therefore the Court finds that Mr. Gamble does have standing to file this 
petition under this statute. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. The Motion to Dismiss filed by respondents Catherine J. Wheeler and Daniel R. Larsen is 
hereby DENIED. 
2. The Court pursuant to 78-3a-44.5 U.C.A. appoints a Guardian ad Litem to represent the best 
interest of the above named children. 
3. The Petition for Termination of Parental Rights field by, Petitioner Gentry Gamble is hereby 
set for a Pre-trial Hearing on fy^offiwm'AaX \\-\h(\W~ before Honorable Judge Andrew 
Valdez J «**yX"XTZ''''<o 
BY THE COURT 
m^F 
Judge Andrew Vagfee)-.' 
Effective July 1, 1997 the statute no longer has subsection 1 (a) or (b). The statue now 
contains only subsection 1 with the term "including foster parents" added. Utah Code Ann. 78-
3a-404(l)(1997) 
